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Heidegger, Will to Power and Gestell
A dominant reading of Heidegger conceives of temporality, Ereignis , the copula, via an  interpenetrating
of fact and value,   the in-between of  performativity.  Between beings and being
or ontological and ontic for them means between  form(representation) and content, subject and
 object, theory and practice, statis and change.
According to John Caputo, to radicalize the thinking of experience is to avoid the temptation to preempt the
play of history by reifying it into formalisms. He cites many ways in which philosophy has attempted to force
experience into such ungroundable universals, such as the Cartesian idea of truth as correspondence with an
independent reality, with language acting as the pure vehicle of communication or mediation between
an autonomous subject and an environment. Even as the more recent efforts of semiological
structuralists (Saussure, Lacan, Chomsky, Levi-Strauss) broke away from this atomistic tradition by
positing language as a system of signs regulated by the unity of a schematic center, Caputo
recognizes that these writers failed to address the historical genesis of such structures. He re-iterates
the poststructuralist realization that larger structures and conventions of language are as
ungroundable and contingent as the particulars which they presumably regulate.
Against these tendencies, Caputo argues there would be no infinite which steers or commands
all things, no center or origin which is the key to a system of signs. Instead, there would be a
differential system of signifiers without signified. Caputo says "Repetition and representation cut into
the very essence of signs, and it is never possible to separate out an original and a representative
element within them" (RH133). Caputo affirms that language transforms what it embraces; in
representing thought it always represents differently-disruptively.
There would be no metavocabulary to arrive at, only a continual re-contextualization of language conventions
and practices. If we create the world through speech rather than approximate it, this is not a unidirectional
endeavor. We don't invent words for our purposes, we are invented and reinvented, along with our purposes, by
the contingent vocabularies that we participate in as cultural beings, and these vocabularies are transient.
Not the autonomous self-conscious subject intimate with her goals, but the heteronymous subject
always at a distance from herself, losing and gaining her identity differently through history. Caputo
refers to this repetition of becoming as flux, and also as an ethics of dissemination, borrowing the
term from Derrida. For Caputo, the conventions of language and culture which lay claim to us as
individuals are utterly without permanence. The very basis of experience in its radical contingency
guarantees the inevitable dispersal of all power structures(Radical Hermeneutics 288) which would try to persist
in their self-sameness; to understand this is to actively and endlessly participate in a critical emancipation from
certainties. Caputo says that the instability in personal experience that this implies requires a
jettisoning of a notion of `self' in favor of a site of `non-identity, difference'(RH289), flux, a place of
"disruption, irruption, solicitation"(RH289).
James Osborn associates Gestell (enframing, schema, theory) with "the problem of the theoretical reduction of
being (enframing, schematization, etc."), "the schematization of subjectivity-objectivity", "concept, theory,
object of knowledge", "terms of a formula",  'mechanical arrangement and technical know-how' . The topic of
Ereignis enters his discussions of Heidegger  via the thematics of transformation. He writes  "Sein cannot be a
fixed structure or static nature but must  also have a transformative activity, movement, and relation in its
nature."  'Being itself is transformation', "transformation as praxis "goes beyond being a concept, theory, object
of  knowledge, etc. It somehow concerns the wholeness of beings in their multi-dimensionality."
"Transformation is  inherently something that happens to and with beings in the whole of their being."  "Finally,
then, what Heidegger’s performative imperative is about is “enacting self-transformation,”  which requires an
“interruption on selfhood” in which the human being is displaced out of representational meanings of self and
into Dasein."
We might be tempted to assume that, by making non-dialectical movement and becoming the central ethic of
experience, the hold of foundational metaphysics has been broken, and that this primordial transitivity of Being
drives the movement of Heideggerian temporality, the ontological difference and Ereignis.
But if we examine Heidegger’s treatment of Nietzsche’s Will to Power in  'The Word of Nietzsche:" God Is
Dead"' , (located in The Question Concerning Technology), it seems that  Heidegger identified Nietzsche’s
thinking of  self-transformation of  values-structures as the last stand of metaphysics.
 Heidegger  argues "The will to power is the ground of the necessity of  value-positing and of the origin of the
possibility of value judgment." "The principle of value-positing" comes out  of the ground of Being as Will to
Power. According to Heidegger's reading,  particular value-structures become  stabilized by the Will, and
present themselves to the subject. This "constant reserve"(William Lovitt's translation,  seemingly closely allied
with 'standing reserve') belongs to the sphere from out of which the will to power wills itself.
 Heidegger concludes that Will to Power, as the principle of value positing, remains within metaphysics. But
what is of particular interest to me is how Heidegger treats the nature of Nietzschean value-structures. He
appears  to derive them via his analysis of present-to-hand interpretation in Being and Time. How so?  He says,
as valuative perspective, point-of-view "has set before itself and thus posited what is  sighted". "This that is
steadily constant, however, is transformed into the fixedly constant, i.e., becomes that  which stands steadily at
something's disposal, only in being brought to a stand through a setting in place. That setting in place has the
character of a producing that sets before. That which is steadily constant in this
 way is that which remains."
 What Heidegger seems to be doing here is showing how Nietzsche modifies interpretation into theoretical
statement.  What is sighted is what is posited, via a levelling down of the circumspective 'as' structure into mere
subject-predicate  'pointing to'.  It is in this way made 'fixedly constant' as present-to-hand Being in a classical
metaphysical sense.  Heidegger writes "Often Nietzsche calls that which is steadily constant-again remaining
true to the manner of speaking  of metaphysical thinking-"Being."". Like Caputo's  'tentative schemes',
"structures which evolve, linger for a while  and pass"(RH198),  "contingent arrangements of signs"(p.220),
Nietzschean beings, as values, linger, 'remain', are  'constant' within a contingent time-frame.
 Let's compare this to Heidegger's discussion of the statement, or assertion,  in Being and Time. My aim in
revisiting what is well-trodden ground for most Heideggerians is to show how the interpretation of Kehre and
Ereignis is shaped by  the way one reads Heidegger's ontological grounding of theory, perspective, Gestell,
science in Being and Time.
 Heidegger  considers the statement , as assertion, as the basis of theory, logic and  the objectivity of the
 natural sciences. "Statement is tantamount to predication". A "predicate" is "stated" about a "subject," the
 latter is determined by the former." "Positing the subject, positing the predicate, and positing them together
 are thoroughly "apophantic" in the strict sense of the word.  "Like interpretation in general, the statement
necessarily has its existential foundations in fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. But how does the
statement become a derivative mode of interpretation?  What has been modified in it?" Heidegger says
predication  points something out in a way that we sheerly look at it. By transforming the circumspective
'something  "as" something' into 'this subject "as" this object', the 'as' is forced back to the uniform level of what
is merely objectively present. It "dwindles to the structure of just letting what is objectively present be seen by
way of determination."When we just stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a failure to
understand it any more." Heidegger recognizes the theoretical as an impoverished, 'cut-off' modification of
understanding. But because, ontologically,  it originates from and never departs from heedful circumspective
care, it is not in-itself devoid of transformation, such as to require supplementation by a notion of the
transformative. Such supplementation was Nietzsche's gesture in the form of the Will to Power's value-positing.
 If one begins from the thinking  of value-perspective as fundamental to beings, then in order
 to express the contingency of these constructions, it is necessary to invoke an additional gesture. Even if
 one claims the event of transformation as a complex unity of same-difference; Ereignis functions as 'more than'
 structure, it  is the happening of what happens to a being. James Osborn writes that transformation as praxis
"goes beyond being a concept, theory, object of knowledge, etc". By contrast, the heedful circumspective 'as'
structure of being-in-the-world  determines such entities as concepts,  schemes, etc, to be already internally split
as fore-structuring temporality, transformed within their supposed lingering as 'this', before there would ever
need to be a 'going beyond'. Transformation  would not be what happens to a being, it would be to say that 'to
be' is already a happening.
 For Heidegger Nietzsche is the last metaphysician  because he determines truth in relation to the establishment
 of  value-scheme.  "Despite all his overturnings and revaluings of metaphysics,  Nietzsche remains in the
unbroken line of the metaphysical tradition when he calls that which is established and made fast in the will to
power for its own preservation purely and simply Being, or what is in being, or truth. Accordingly, truth is a
condition posited in the essence of the will to power, namely, the condition of the preservation of power. Truth
is, as this condition, a value." It is not that, for Heidegger, Nietzsche fails to overcome , to think 'more than'
truth as value-structure, or  as Osborn puts it, to bring "thought to a region beyond the schematization of
subjectivity-objectivity", to the happenng of Being. Heidegger says "moving out beyond itself", the "opening up
and supplementing" of possibilities belongs to the essence of the Will to Power.
 But beginning from schematism is starting too late ("But because the will can will only from out of its disposal
over something steadily constant, truth is a necessary value precisely from out of the essence of the will to
power, for that will"). Starting from beings as value-structures turns Will to Power itself into a value, the
highest value.  What Nietzsche fails to do is think from WITHIN, that is , AS the supposed self-presencing
lingering of the schematism. The fore-structuring gesture of transcendence is not what goes beyond schematism,
or before it as its condition of possibility,  but what is 'built into' it, what happens IN the 'is', AS the 'is.
 Heidegger tells us that in the manner of positing as point of view, as  pointing out, forming the thinking of
 theoretical proposition, one is at the same time  "putting together and taking apart"(synthesis and diairesis) .
 But this way of binding and separating externalizes  and formalizes itself(via "the analysis of logos in an
 external "theory of judgment"") as  a "relating", a "system of coordinations" BETWEEN representations.
Heidegger  inquires: "what phenomenon is it then WITHIN(emphasis mine) the structure of the logos that
allows and requires us to characterize every statement as synthesis and diairesis? What is to be got at
phenomenally with the formal structures of "binding" and "separating," more precisely, with the unity of the
two, is the phenomenon of "something as something.""
 As an "ontologically insufficient interpretation of the logos", what the mode of interpretation of propositional
 statement doesn't understand about itself is that thinking of itself as external 'relating' makes  the propositional
 'is' an inert synthesis, and conceals its ontological basis as attuned, relevant taking of 'something AS
something'. In accordance with this affected-affecting care structure, something is understood WITH REGARD
TO something else. This means that it is taken together with it, but not in the manner of  a synthesizing relating.
Heidegger instead describes the 'as'  as a "confrontation that understands, interprets, and articulates, [and] at the
same time takes apart what has been put together."  Transcendence locates itself in this way within the very
heart of the theoretical concept. Simply determining something AS something is a transforming-performing. It
"understands, interprets, and articulates", and thereby "takes apart" and changes what it affirms by merely
pointing at it, by merely having it happen to 'BE' itself. Thus, the problem of the primordial grounding of the
'is’, and the analysis of the logos are the same problem."...if the formal characteristics of "relation" and
"binding" cannot contribute anything phenomenally to the factual structural analysis of the logos, the
phenomenon intended with the term copula finally has nothing to do with bond and binding."
Heidegger writes: "The "is" here speaks transitively, in transition. Being here becomes present in the manner of
a transition to beings. But Being does not leave its own place and go over to beings, as though beings were first
without Being and could be approached by Being subsequently. Being transits (that), comes unconcealingly over
(that) which arrives as something of itself unconcealed only by that coming-over." “That differentiation alone
grants and holds apart the "between," in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward one another,
are borne away from and toward each other."(Identity and Difference.p.64)
 If Gestell as understood undeconstructively as present-to-hand value-structure ("structures which evolve, linger
for a while  and pass"(RH198)), the notion of transformation becomes an external binding, and Heidegger’s
equi-primordial grounding modes of Being(care, discourse, attunement, temporality, the ‘is’) are forced into the
role of value-structures.
 (All citations from Being and Time are the Stambaugh translation, German pages 157-160)
